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There has been much agonizing in the past few years about a creeping
bureaucratization of the judiciary. Perhaps it is not coincidental that this
concern came into vogue about the same time as supply-side economics.
The refrain is familiar: Act now to cut judges' staffs and caseloads, so that
they will invest more of their own energies and intellect; this investment
will in turn increase judicial productivity, reduce word inflation, and en-
hance quality control. With a bit of luck, the reduction in court staff will
lower case deficits, improve the balance of trade in slip opinions among
the circuits, and expand consumer demand. The only anomaly in this sce-
nario is that it holds no likelihood of increasing employment, for I gather
the ultimate objective is to dismiss the clerks and return to the halcyon
days when judges crafted their own opinions by the flickering light of
kerosene lamps.
I do not intend to treat the bureaucratization debate disrespectfully, but
I admit to being taken aback by commentators who have suddenly discov-
ered that courts are complex organizations and that their work product
inevitably reflects that complexity.' "Can't we somehow revert," they say,
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
1. Although it represents a slight digression, I cannot forego the opportunity to comment that, at
least in the court on which I serve, our greatest exposure to bureaucratic decisionmaking comes from
the substantive nature of our caseload, predominantly appeals from administrative agency orders and
rules. Our limited role in reviewing such agency decisions-largely the product of bureaucratic
processes in the classic sense-is to determine whether agency procedures are in accord with the
Administrative Procedure Act, whether there is "substantial evidence" for agency findings, and
whether the decision is not arbitrary and capricious. We have very limited authority to interpret or
apply the law according to our own reading or research. Unless they are palpably irrational, we must
approve the decisions initially made by administrative law judges or lower echelon agency employees
and approved by politically appointed boards, commissions, or administrators. Such decisions often
incorporate all the disturbing aspects of bureaucratic decisionmaking alluded to by Professor Fiss:
decisionmaking based on collective knowledge, executive summaries, and briefings; decisionmaking at
levels removed from exposure to the people affected; and decisionmaking based on hidden agendas and
political considerations. Yet the pristine federal judge, who would eschew all such practices in his or
her own realm, is required to review and, in the overwhelming majority of cases to approve,
thousands of such decisions each year.
Insofar as Professor Fiss also worries about any tendency of courts to adopt rigid, rule-oriented
decisional processes rather than adhering to a tradition of empirical, individually-oriented judgments,
the role of courts like ours in passing on the multitude of agency rules that focus on uniform standards
regardless of individual equities must also give pause. Rulemaking has virtually taken over the admin-
istrative law field from case-by-case adjudication; I venture to say we judges affect many more lives,
livelihoods, business survivals, and pocketbooks as a result of passing on such rules than we do as a
result of deciding individual cases, where we can still adjust and enlarge precedent to take account of
specific factual patterns. Our own court rules, mainly pertaining to procedure and evidence, are, Fiss
points out, buffered with room for discretion to account for individual differences; the agency rules we
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"to the judge as the kindly, self-reliant, innately just, circuit-riding chan-
cellor?" No way. The cases proliferate and become ever more complex
and time consuming. While dutifully admiring of those few judges who
say they are still going it alone, I fear they are a wasting asset.
I also worry about where this debate is taking us. The frequently noted
solution of reducing our caseload could reverse a series of salutary devel-
opments. The heavier caseload in large part reflects better access to the
courts and more legal protections and benefits for less-favored members of
society. I resist any wholesale surrender of these hard-fought victories to
"reformers" rallying under the banner of judicial efficiency.
Given these reservations, I agree with Professor Fiss' grand design for
approaching the problem. As Fiss concedes, the courts hardly operate as a
bureaucratic hierarchy. Vertically-district to circuit, circuit to Supreme
Court-the federal judiciary does not function in the hierarchical fashion
of a typical bureaucracy. Within multimember appellate courts, as well,
there is certainly no hierarchical order of command. The absence of other
key elements of the classical bureaucracy also makes the label inappropri-
ate for the courts.
Professor Fiss therefore wants to reshape the debate into an analysis of
the courts' institutional form: to identify the "bureaucratic" features of the
court system, define the threats they pose to important judicial values, and
formulate institutional arrangements that preserve those values while ena-
bling courts to cope with an increased workload. This takes the problem
now posed under the caption "judicial bureaucracy" and changes it into
an inquiry about how the courts can do their work better in the face of
increasing demands on their time and less than adequate resources.
I. Professor Fiss's Proposals
Professor Fiss focuses on the stresses in our court system created by the
growth of staff, not judges, and identifies the isolation from critical educa-
tional experiences and the diffusion of judicial responsibility as the great-
est problems created by that change. He has a two-tiered strategy for
meeting the problem: separating legal from managerial tasks, 2 and struc-
uphold, however, are predominantly utilitarian, providing little or no succor for the individuals chosen
as sacrifices to the commonweal.
While the focus of the bureaucratization debate has been on how we do our work, our greatest
contribution to bureaucracy may be in what real-life circumstances force us to do, that is, in our
limited review and almost unanimous affirmance of the vast number of bureaucratically-arrived-at
decisions. There is no doubt, in that regard, that we function as an indispensable adjunct to the
federal bureaucracy whose decisionmaking practices we are urged to avoid.
2. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1461 (1983).
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turing the newly focused legal tasks to concentrate responsibility in the
judge.' He offers a number of proposals to implement his strategy.
First, he would curb the use of special masters, increasingly employed
to monitor and enforce judicial decisions in institutional litigation, and
replace them by expert witnesses and amici.4 I am extremely skeptical.
My experience as a litigator in these frustratingly complex suits was
that the entry of the decree or the signing of a settlement was only the
first step in obtaining real relief for the plaintiff. Like the generals who
declare victory and hasten aboard ship while the guerilla forces stalk the
defenseless port, expert witnesses and amici often leave the trial judge to
fend for himself once the legal victory is declared. Soon the outraged
plaintiff's counsel reappears with a motion for enforcement or contempt.
Conditions and events change-the relief ordered produces unanticipated
consequences-and the judge finds himself in the middle of a second war.
Traditionally, expert witnesses and amici have been individuals or or-
ganizations with expertise and well-developed positions on particular is-
sues; they are rarely equipped or willing to become the eyes and ears of
the judge in the day-to-day monitoring of a decree, or to perform detailed
investigations that may help the judge resolve disputes incidental to the
decree. Indeed, it is problematic whether such a role would be appropriate
for them, since in most cases they will have taken a decisive position on
one side or the other during the trial leading to the decree.
The special master, on the other hand, is generally perceived as a neu-
tral figure, accessible to both sides and operating under the direct supervi-
sion and authority of the court itself. Given the strong public feeling
aroused by these cases, I do not worry greatly that judges will permit
masters to make vital decisons without appropriate consultation. I have
not seen it happen. In such a volatile setting, the master's role is crucial.
He reports on compliance, decides or negotiates the problems that arise
daily under the court's decree, and recommends further (or lesser) relief
depending on changed circumstances. As a representative of the court, the
master moderates the excesses of the protagonists. Professor Fiss may con-
sider masters as watered-down judges or even usurpers, but in my view
they are an indispensable extension of the trial judge so long as the court
retains jurisdiction over these non-static cases.
I feel the same way about reliance upon magistrates, whose use Fiss
would also like to curb. He worries that enlargement of magistrates' juris-
diction diffuses trial judges' decisional responsibility, burdens judges with
supervisory tasks, and removes judges from exposure to real evidence and
3. Id. at 1462-67.
4. Id. at 1462-63.
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participants.5 I agree that the real scourge of "bureaucracy" comes when
the formal decisionmaker has no contact with the original sources of infor-
mation or with the full array of options that may exist. Yet, for all his
alarms, I do not find Professor Fiss' fears about the judiciary particularly
gripping in this context.
A number of factors limit the diffusion of responsibility from judge to
magistrate. Magistrate selection is firmly lodged in judges. The close
working relationship between magistrates and judges ensures that judges'
standards are quickly transmitted to magistrates and reinforced on a con-
tinuous basis. Finally, trial judges realize that they are fully responsible
for decisions based on the findings or recommendations of their "subjudg-
es"; appellate judges do not hesitate to reverse unsubstantiated decisions or
findings.
When we debate the utility of magistrates we must ask, "compared to
what?" The use of magistrates is far preferable to denying large groups of
litigants access to judicial review. For example, rejected social security dis-
ability applicants whose appeals are heard initially by a magistrate are on
the whole better off than their counterpart veteran applicants, who have
no judicial review at all. Professor Fiss' answer is more district judges.6
Though I could hardly dissent, I imagine he would concede that there is
often a long wait between a recognized need and congressional authoriza-
tion of additional judges.
Professor Fiss' third proposal is the creation of more specialized courts,
although he recognizes their dangers and specifies few new areas that
warrant their use.7 I share the concerns about specialty courts expressed
elsewhere by Judge Clifford Wallace.' Specialty courts invite domination
by the specialized bar-no one else understands or cares. Worse, the nar-
row focus of the judges and their isolation from the mainstream of the law
can lead to arcane legal developments in one area of the law at odds with
fundamental legal principles and values in others. Moreover, as Judge
Wallace points out, "it is not clear that precise jurisdictional definitions
can ensure that the specialist judge will hear only the specialized subject
matter." As the recent plight of bankruptcy judges instructs, the ability to
package coherent bodies of law in casebooks or even in statutes does not
ensure that the legal issues will remain neatly categorized in lawsuits.10
5. Id. at 1456.
6. Id. at 1463.
7. Id. at 1464-66.
8. Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain
or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913 (1983).
9. Id. at 933.
10. It is incongruous for Professor Fiss to warn of insensitivity and unresponsiveness in delegated
decisionmaking by magistrates or masters, and at the same time to endorse specialized courts that in
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Professor Fiss' concern with limiting "bureaucratic pathologies" by
structuring court staffs to ensure that judges are fully responsible for the
staff's work11 is a legitimate worry. With respect to law clerks, a judge
must be sure to take responsibility for any and all of their work that finds
its way into the final product. The hard part is learning how to manage
law clerks effectively to increase the quality and quantity of the judge's
own input and output.
I am not, however, overly concerned that a judge's final decision reflects
discussions with law clerks. Most decisions benefit from a continuing dia-
logue between judge and law clerk, before as well as after the result is
determined.
As for research and writing, so long as the judge reads all the briefs and
relevant portions of the record, engages counsel at oral argument, partici-
pates in the pre-decision discussion with his or her colleagues, and con-
trols the formulation and expression of the ideas and analysis that go into
his or her opinion, the job is responsibly done. Whether the judge writes
the first draft for the clerk to criticize and flesh out, or the clerk writes the
first draft for the judge to review, revise, challenge or accept, does not
conclusively indicate whether the judge is still in charge.
Finally, Professor Fiss wants to strengthen the traditions of individual
responsibility by separating more sharply the managerial and adjudicatory
functions of the judge.2 For law to be a dynamic force, it must guide
participants in processes structured by the law and take account of their
capacities, problems, incentives, and resources. If I have any major fault to
find with appellate decisions, it is that they are increasingly academic and
isolated from real life. They are frequently insensitive-occasionally obliv-
ious-to the ways in which they will affect practitioners and fellow trial
judges, let alone ordinary people carrying on ordinary lives.
Appellate courts' responsibility to bring trial courts within a circuit into
reasonable uniformity often entails prescribing procedures or criteria for
the trial courts to use in making decisions. This is one way we ensure
judicial accountability. We thus face unavoidable "managerial" issues in
matters ranging from the kind of proof that suffices to show "prevailing
rates" in an attorneys' fees case to the "clear bright line" for policemen in
Fourth Amendment law. Is it an exercise of judicial responsibility or "bu-
reaucratic management" to require trial judges who dismiss in forina
effect shut out the nonspecialized world. The lawyer's task of making technical matter intelligible for
generalist judges, and the judge's job of making technical decisions understandable to the public, are
both elements of any effort to ensure judicial accountability.
11. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1466-67.
12. Id. at 1461.
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pauperis petitions to give reasons? Perhaps Professor Fiss can make this
distinction; I cannot."
In sum, I agree with Professor Fiss that we must end the obsession
with caseload and focus on organizational form." However, much of his
prescription inclines too much toward the quaintly anachronistic notion
that judicial responsibility requires freeing judges from worrying about
how others act so that they can worry about doing everything themselves.
That style, I fear, is from a simpler, long-gone era. If we are to preserve
the true judicial functions, we can and must delegate duties once per-
formed entirely by judges, but we must insure that the judges stay in con-
trol of the process. We must define the precious non-delegable duties that
insure judicial accountability and guard them zealously. In that search,
the federal bench welcomes Professor Fiss' help.
II. Managing the Judicial Decision Process
Although I have presented my own suggestions for improvement in
greater detail elsewhere," I would like briefly to sketch several of my
main proposals here. In my view, judges ought to give more attention to
managing the judicial process. Any institution, such as the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, that processes over 1,000 cases a year and decides them
with tens of thousands of pages of explanation by eleven judges of equal
stature has to be managed. But managed for what end?
I suggest that we should aim to decide cases accurately, explain our
reasoning clearly, and strive for uniformity among our rulings-all in a
timely fashion. Finally, we need to enhance public confidence in the court
as an institution by maintaining its historic strength: having a personal-
ized judiciary make decisions through the application of impersonalized
rules. I believe the fear that the last objective is being sacrificed to attain
the other four is at the heart of much angst about judicial "bureaucracy."
The prime resource we have to accomplish these goals is judges' time.
Our task is to manage the courts to preserve the personalized judicial role.
The external accountability of courts depends vitally on judges' personal
involvement, including providing reasoned decisions, identifying the au-
13. Should appellate courts quit using their "supervisory jurisdiction" to lay down uniform rules
for conducting preliminary hearings within hours of arrest, as the Supreme Court did in McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)? Surely Professor Fiss does not want us to delegate these "mana-
gerial judgments" to others such as the circuit executive? But where do we draw the line? He suggestsjudicial rulemaking instead of adjudication for some of these decisions. In my experience that is far too
time-consuming and cumbersome a process to offer any practical relief.
14. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1460.
15. For more detailed analysis of the problems confronting the federal courts, and some sugges-
tions for change, see Wald, The Problem With the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality
Under Challenge, 42 MD. L. REV. 766 (1983).
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thors of our opinions by name, and listening to oral argument. Personal
involvement also reduces the dangers of an isolated judiciary that so con-
cern Professor Fiss.
The opinions in which we explain our decisions provide one method by
which we are held personally accountable. Thus, we should regard with
some concern the growing reliance of my own and most other courts on
summary orders and unpublished per curiam memoranda, unattributable
to any one author. These modes of decision accounted for forty-nine per-
cent of our merits cases and virtually all of our motions determinations
last year. Unless the use of unexplained orders and unpublished and un-
citable opinions is monitored carefully, it permits judges to decide which
of their decisions will become precedent and which will not, increases the
likelihood of nonuniform dispositions, and diminishes individual judicial
visibility and accountability. The exercise of writing for personal attribu-
tion even a few sentences of rationale insures a level of thought that a
mere signal of affirmance, dismissal, or reversal does not.
The process by which we arrive at decisions must also inspire confi-
dence. In the environment of judicial decisionmaking, oral argument is a
vital but endangered species. While some circuits have faced the time
crunch of overloaded dockets by limiting oral argument to fewer than fifty
percent of their cases, it should be recognized that oral argument serves a
number of important functions.
First, the fact that we actually listen to, question, and may be directly
moved by litigants is imperative to the respect the public grants us and the
authority that flows from that respect. Oral argument places the deci-
sionmaker face-to-face with the contestants and gives what is often a re-
mote and abstract legal system an important human character.
Oral argument also performs the valuable screening function of helping
us decide how to allocate our efforts among cases. Seemingly inauspicious
cases can blossom into consequential ones through probing interrogation
that delves into subjects either avoided or inartfully presented in briefs.
Pointed inquiry can identify areas where the law is clear or muddled,
where the case may be disposed of summarily or may require more
lengthy treatment. Oral argument keeps the lawyers honest-under cross-
examination from the court, counsel will often concede points they have
smugly assumed on paper.
Finally, and not insignificantly, a judge prepares a case differently
when there is oral argument. In anticipation of an exchange, a judge
delves for gaps or inconsistencies in the parties' positions that might be
missed under summary consideration.
We also have to make our collegial court system work better. Collegial
systems seem inherently inefficient; this is the price we pay for containing
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the arbitrariness of any one judge. Writing to accommodate, conciliate,
appease, and persuade other panel members requires more care and more
compromise than simply expressing one's own thoughts on a subject. Nev-
ertheless, there are ways to speed up collegial decisionmaking on our cir-
cuit courts.
I endorse a "bubble theory" under which judges are free to decide how
best to use and manage their personal staffs and how to develop their
written product. However, to make the bubble theory work, and to keep
judges operating in a reasonably synchronous fashion, we need to set time
limits on the process of rendering decisions. We impose deadlines on law-
yers, at least in theory; we should be willing to impose them on ourselves.
Group norms do matter to judges even if we are unwilling to convert them
into enforceable sanctions. Our court has in fact adopted some rules to
encourage timely decisionmaking.1 6
Smooth case flow management can help allocate judges' time more ef-
fectively and efficiently. The court's staff counsel already aids us by as-
signing similar cases to the same panel or, where appropriate, by consoli-
dating such cases. Especially in multiparty cases, .pre-argument
conferences with counsel can identify and clarify issues for briefing, avoid
duplicative presentations, and focus the allocation of time for oral
argument.
Finally, I have a "radical" proposal: I think the circuit's judges should
occasionally engage in formalized judicial bull sessions, where they can
clarify or reconcile their different perceptions of common problems. We
all realize there are murky areas of a court's jurisprudence. The purpose
of sharing views on such topics would not be to rigidify thought and defi-
nitely not to decide abstract issues. Rather, these sessions could make us
more sensitive to our colleagues' viewpoints and perhaps establish a gen-
eral aura of agreement on our responsibility, as a court, to maximize
accord.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, our search for bureaucratic nits on the judicial
body reflects a fear that overworked judges will delegate too much respon-
sibility to aides, not do their own research, not write their own opinions,
and not devote enough time to each case to do justice. Such a judiciary
would forfeit the institutional integrity and respect accorded to an
16. For example, at present our court has an internal working rule that a judge cannot hear cases
in a new term if he or she has not circulated draft opinions on more than three cases from the
preceding terms. We also have adopted a rule, similar to ones in several other circuits, requiring a
judge to respond to a circulated draft opinion within seven days. Another rule provides that the judge
who wrote the panel opinion may release it if he or she does not receive a dissent within thirty days.
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unelected judiciary in a democratic society. This unhappy state could oc-
cur, however, with large or small caseloads, and with many or few judges.
Good judges and good bureaucrats need not forego structural and manage-
ment adaptations. Both will use clerks, staff counsel, magistrates, masters,
and other resources to do their judging work better than they could do it
alone. Effective management of the courts' decisionmaking process can
help maintain a personalized, accountable judiciary. But management can
only help preserve and bring to the fore what is already there. In the final
analysis, it is not bureaucracy we need fear so much as laziness, incompe-
tence, lack of care, loss of caring, or weariness. The fault and the fix may
lie in ourselves.
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